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  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Every time there's a new tool, whether it's Internet or cell phones or anything 
else, all these things can be used for good or evil. Technology is neutral; 
 it depends on how it's used.” ~ Rick Smolan  
 
Although the internet itself is not new, it is continually reinventing itself. As it 
changes, people use it in novel ways that bring new and sometimes terrible 
consequences. And so, in late August of 2014, one of the internet’s newer 
evolutions, social media, was thrust into the center of controversy as popular social 
media websites like Twitter began circulating a terrifying video far and wide 
throughout the vast reaches of their audiences. A man clad in black, waving a knife 
in his hand and issuing threats to America, stood menacingly in a desert scene. 
Another man knelt calmly before him. This man,      James Foley,      was just 
moments from death      when his captor’s blade would separate his head from his 
body     . The aftermath of the gruesome scene and the threating message that 
accompanied it were suddenly catapulted across all reaches of society as people on 
social media sites shared the video, some for its shock value and others who were 
simply in disbelief of what they just watched. But there were others who, with their 
estimated 45,000 associated Twitter accounts, intentionally shared the video for its 
message and helped launch ISIS and its quest for a caliphate onto the global center 
stage (Berger, 2015). 
Since then, social media platforms have waged a hard, but ill-fought battle 
against terror groups using the platforms to spread propaganda, recruit, and 
ultimately radicalize new individuals for their cause around the world. But what, if 
any, notable effects does this method have on these individuals and how they are 
recruited and radicalized? Is social media really a drastically new form of 
recruitment, or is it simply the latest technological convenience being used to 
communicate just as cell phones were when they were invented? This paper will 
examine this research question: do any significant differences exist between social 
media radicalization and recruitment methods as compared to other more traditional 
methods. This author hypothesizes that social media has created significant new 
recruiting advantages for terror organizations and that it has also introduced a new 
form of online self-radicalization that did not previously exist. This theory will be 
examined through a meta-analysis of researchers’ studies on the recruitment 
strategies of terror groups and the radicalization process of group and lone-wolf 
terrorists. The hypothesis of a new kind of online self-radicalization will be 
examined through a case study of the 2019 terror attack on Christchurch, New 
Zealand. Finally, in light of these findings, recommendations will be made as to 
how the government, social media companies, and society should address these 
 
new trends in terror recruitment. Special attention is given to poorly understood 
concepts such as how communications through social media platforms and other 
internet forums function different than more direct, traditional methods of 
communication.  
VIRTUAL RECRUITMENT AND RADICALIZATION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Internet-based communication platforms, and social media in particular, have 
quickly become the predominant communication and recruitment mediums for new 
members of international terror organizations (Aly; Blaker; Hamm; Koehler; 
Smith). They are used to target recruits from younger generations who are already 
familiar with this technology as a regular part of their everyday lives. For example, 
groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have been known for posting martyrdom videos to 
the internet to inspire new recruits while regularly engaging in online chatrooms 
and instant messaging through sites like Facebook and Twitter to communicate 
directly with potential recruits (Smith, 2018). Extreme right-wing groups have 
begun to migrate from political rallies and specific websites to using social media 
as their main propaganda tools for radicalizing new individuals (Koehler, 2014). 
While other more traditional methods of recruitment are still utilized by these kinds 
of groups, the dominance of recruiting via social media is an important trend to 
analyze because of the significant recruiting advantages it affords radical groups 
over other forms of communication like cell phones, radio, email, and face-to-face 
meetings.  
 
Social Media as a Recruitment Tool 
 
The ability to recruit via social media offers terror organizations several distinct 
advantages when attempting to find, recruit, and radicalize new individuals for their 
cause. First, social media sites afford organizations with limited resources an 
immediate global audience. The growing interconnectedness of the world via the 
internet is helping radical terror groups effortlessly expand their reach across 
international borders that their recruitment capabilities might otherwise be confined 
to (Aly; Blaker; Gill; Huey). This dramatically expands the number of potential 
recruits and supporters these groups can reach and creates second-order effects with 
substantial benefits. For example, by virtually recruiting individuals overseas to 
carry out foreign terror attacks, these groups save significant sums of money that 
would have been spent on international travel. Additionally, by avoiding frequent 
travel in and out of their host country to the target nation, they also avoid the risk 
of being detected by authorities abroad. 
 A second recruitment benefit is that social media enables individuals with a 
high potential of being radicalized to seek out the terror groups on their own by 
 
browsing digital content and initiating dialogue (Aly; Gill; Hamm; Huey). This 
saves these organizations from bearing the entire burden of trying to locate potential 
recruits and helps them connect with many who would otherwise be overlooked 
simply because of a lack of direct personal connections. In particular, “lone wolf” 
radicals, individuals who may carry out acts of violence by themselves, now have 
access to digital communication mediums that help them seek out other people with 
similar radical beliefs. This provides opportunity for dialogue with other radicals 
when previously they were isolated individuals and lacked the confidence that 
comes from group identity (Hamm; Smith). This process also has the potential to 
serve as a risk reduction tool for recruiters. As individuals who are comfortable 
with radical messaging will seek out, find, and engage with the recruiters online, 
the organizations reduce the risk of exposing their ties to terror with non-radical 
individuals who would report their activity.  
 The most widely researched recruitment benefit afforded by social media is 
its ability to cultivate an echo chamber for the radical beliefs of new recruits while 
creating a community to draw them into (Behr; Gill; Hamm; Klausen; Smith; 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). Social media, unlike traditional forms 
of media such as cable television or newspapers, provides content that can be 
curated exclusively by the end user. As people have a natural tendency to follow 
sources of information with which they agree, recruiters can encourage new recruits 
to follow and digest more radical sources of thought and tune out other ideas (Behr; 
Klausen). This reinforcement of ideas proves effective in getting the individual to 
more closely identify with the expressed radical sentiments. More importantly, the 
recruits now see similar information coming from a number of people, accounts, 
organizations, etc. and begin to build a sense of belonging to a community beyond 
their individual self (Behr; Gill; Smith; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 
Additionally, this creates a sense of “strength in numbers”      or “     pack”      
mentality that can encourage individual “     lone wolves”      to carry out actions 
they would not otherwise do on their own without encouragement from the group.  
 
Social Media as a Radicalization Mechanism 
 
Recruitment is only the first step in interacting with a radical individual who could 
potentially commit acts of terror. In order for the individual to progress to the point 
where they are willing to carry out acts of violence, typically against a rational 
understanding of self-interest, a more robust process of radicalization must take 
place. Whether or not social media can actually provide a sufficient medium for the 
full radicalization process to take place is a matter of debate. On one end of the 
spectrum, some research indicates there are cases where the vast majority of an 
individual’s radicalization occurred via the internet and social media (Blaker, 
2015). This was the case for more than 3000 individuals who left behind their lives 
 
in developed Western nations to join the enlisted ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS). Cases like these, however, are often associated with particular 
groups and do not necessarily warrant extrapolation to other instances of 
radicalization. On the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that full 
radicalization can only occur from real-world interactions between people and that 
social media only acts as a transmitter of information (Huey, 2015). This assertion, 
though, does not offer a robust explanation for terror attacks carried out by 
individuals or small groups with no direct, physical access to the parent terror 
organization.  
As such, the majority of the literature on this subject falls somewhere 
between these two extremes. It is widely thought that social media is at minimum 
a successful facilitator of radicalization, but it must be coupled with other factors 
(Behr; Gill; Huey; Smith). The most significant factors are group dynamics, such 
as affinity for one another (perceived or real), and group strength (Klausen; Smith). 
It is also commonly held that      radicalization is not dependent on the use of social 
media and it is debatable whether or not it can accelerate the radicalization process 
(Behr; Gill). It is, however, particularly effective at radicalizing lone individuals 
who require group interaction and encouragement in order to progress to the more 
advanced stages of radicalization that create a willingness to commit violent acts. 
The psychological effects are particularly strong on these individuals as recruiters 
are able to more easily manipulate them to alter their beliefs by rewarding them 
with group affinity. Ultimately, they lead the recruit to create a sense of identity 
associated with more extreme behaviors (Aly; Hamm; Klausen; United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime).  
The question that looms over the debate on the efficacy of radicalization via 
social media is whether or not this new medium differs in substantial and significant      
ways from traditional media and other means of communication such that it is more 
effective, or if it is simply a new tool in the recruiter’s toolbox that has limited 
capabilities. While no studies are conclusive on this point, the current literature 
does provide clues as to what makes social media so potent as a medium for 
recruitment and radicalization. 
 
Social Media’s Impact on Terrorism 
 
A number of factors work seamlessly together to facilitate social media’s impact 
on terror organization recruitment. First, social media provides complete control 
over messaging to the terror organization (Aly; Huey; Klausen). This differs 
drastically from the traditional terror/media/audience relationship of newspapers 
and television where an organization could commit an act to get their message out, 
but whether or not it was portrayed sympathetically was at the mercy of the media. 
Now, these organizations can reach just as broad of an audience, while tailoring the 
 
messaging attached to their acts to those they are trying to influence the most. This 
relates to the second compounding factor. Social media allows for the rapid 
dissemination of information to the intended audience (Huey; Klausen; United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). Terror organizations can message followers 
around the world with minute-by-minute details. A clear example of this occurred 
in 2013 when al-Shabaab live-tweeted their attack on the Westgate shopping center 
in Nairobi (Aly, 2017). This ability to not only send information quickly, but to be 
able to include videos, professionally made images, or other culturally relevant 
forms of messaging heightens the effectiveness of this recruitment method (Aly; 
Huey; Klausen).  
These factors and others contribute to the efficacy of social media 
recruitment and radicalization that make this form of communication 
fundamentally different than previous forms. They have replaced the need for 
physical contact of recruits and brought professional-grade messaging formats to 
an instant audience of the organization’s own choosing, making social media one 
of the most important factors in individual radicalization (Huey; Koehler; United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). Those who disagree largely base their 
argument on the notion that social media by itself has rarely been the sole factor in 
radicalization, claiming that other forms of contact or communication are needed 
(Behr; Gill). But this does not disprove the idea that radicalization can be achieved 
solely online nor does it negate that social media platforms and virtual interactions 
like web chats often double for the other factors such as community and personal 
interaction. So, while there are some natural advantages to recruiting new 
operatives through in-person interactions, social media has nonetheless expanded 




As it stands, the current literature provides deep analysis of an array of modern 
terror recruitment techniques conducted via the internet and social media platforms. 
What is missing, generally, is actionable data. Too little is known, publicly at least, 
to be able to draw wide conclusions or make comparisons about different forms of 
terror-related messaging and their overall efficacy in converting followers into 
violent terrorists. The literature is also currently limited almost exclusively to 
Islamic terrorism and some American right-wing radical groups’ recruitment 
tactics. Other kinds of radical, terroristic organizations need to be studied to find 
patterns or dissimilarities between their utilization of social media and the ones 
described. If and when these deeper conclusions can be made across violent groups, 
better-informed decisions about how to disrupt these recruitment tactics can be 
made. Presently, most of the efforts focus on simply banning the social media 
accounts supporting terror groups, but it has proven to be nearly impossible to shut 
 
them all down as they can be created just as quickly as they are shut down (Blaker, 
2015). This “whack-a-mole” approach is not sustainable in the long term as terror 
groups can find ways to avoid such bans by utilizing social media websites and 
apps that are more difficult for law enforcement to track their activity on. Instead, 
the present challenge demands a      more robust approach      to locate, counter, and 
disempower this messaging. 
 
     METHODS 
 
This paper examines recommended best practices for the three principal players in 
addressing the use of social media in spreading terror: the government, social media 
companies, and society at large. These three entities were chosen because they bear 
unique roles in how terror groups are able to spread their messaging through social 
media via their abilities to curb it legally, prevent and remove it voluntarily, and 
respond to it, respectively. Specifically, sources were chosen for their 
documentation of such prevention efforts in recent history and for their analysis 
and recommendations of best practices going forward. The conclusions drawn from 
this wide analysis will be applied to a recent case, the March 15th, 2019 terror 
attacks on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. This particular attack was 
chosen among other examples for several reasons. First, it is one of the clearest 
examples of the evolving roles of the internet and social media platforms as they 
pertain to radicalizing individuals towards violence as well as their use for 
spreading the intended message of the terror attack. Second, this attack challenges 
popular notions of what kinds of extremism should be most pertinent to prevention 
efforts. While it can be shown that much work has been done to curtail social media 
messaging of prominent jihadist organizations like ISIS and Al Qaeda, far less 
attention has been given to smaller terror organizations of varying intents, including 
those promoting racial supremacy or anti-Islamic sentiments such as those the 
Christchurch terrorist was linked with. Finally, by examining this attack in detail, 
clues about gaps in the current prevention system can be assessed, the responses to 
the attack by the three chosen stakeholders can be critiqued, and further 
recommendations can be made as a result. If this attack is at all predictive of future 
developments in terror and the use of social media, it is thus important that it is 
examined in detail against current methods and assumptions.  
 This paper will not examine the use of private messaging apps or other one-
to-one electronic communication platforms in detail. These will be addressed in 
general as the use of encrypted messaging is pertinent to the larger issue of 
terrorism but falls beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, this paper will look more 
closely at how messaging on large public forums for social interaction should be 
addressed as it has vastly different implications for society at large, as opposed to 
infiltrating the messaging systems of terror networks that are composed of 
 
established members. So, while these trends are important to note, their solutions 
are markedly different than those that can be employed by the government, social 
media network giants, and the public for responding to propaganda that is 
ultimately intended to reach a public audience. Between them, these three groups 
also face different legal and moral questions regarding the actions they can take.  
 
NEW ZEALAND CASE STUDY 
 
March 15, 2019. 40 injured. 51 dead. These simple statistics cannot begin to 
describe the visceral pain inflicted upon New Zealand’s Christchurch and its 
Muslim community. As details trickled out about this devastating terror attack, one 
realization was quickly made clear: the terrorism of the past several decades was 
over, and terrorism in the age of social media had just begun. The lone terrorist 
made a field day out of the capabilities of social media in this new age. On the day 
before the attack, he posted pictures of his weapons on 8chan. On the day of, he 
released his lengthy political manifesto, filled with references to social media 
culture, on Twitter. A video of the attack itself was live streamed on Facebook for 
the whole world to see (Bogost, 2019). The attacker was virtually linked with 
multiple white supremacist groups from Australia, including through the Facebook 
pages of the United Patriots Front (UPF) and the True Blue Crew (Mann et al., 
2019).  
It is immediately clear that this attack, while ultimately stemming from 
extreme white supremacist and anti-immigrant beliefs, was largely influenced by 
the use and powers of social media. The shooter had been actively following online 
groups and participating in chat rooms      that supported his beliefs and he played 
to the strengths of social media to get his manifesto and video of the attack to spread 
as far and wide and as quickly as possible. The most shocking revelation from this 
attack, however, is that this terrorist not only acted alone, but he was completely 
self-radicalized. Contrary to what many of the authors in the previous literature 
review have theorized, this shooting concretely demonstrated the ability for social 
media to be used to completely radicalize a terrorist for a cause without any direct 
communication or influence from an actual violent group. The shooter had isolated 
himself from community by choosing to live off of an inheritance and not seek out 
work (Zaczek, 2019). From there, he became radicalized by far-right anti-
immigrant views through looking at message boards and Facebook groups. Despite 
deriving his views from these online mediums, he received no direct calls to 
violence from any members of these groups and never formed any sort of actual 
group identity with other extremists (Ravndal, 2019). Rather, the group bonding 
and group identity that is normally thought necessary to radicalize someone to 
commit acts of terrorism for a specific, shared ideology never took place. This 
vindicates the proposed hypothesis that direct recruitment and traditional group 
 
isolation and identity formation processes are not required to fully radicalize a 
terrorist. They can self-isolate and self-radicalize entirely on their own through the 
use and influence of online propaganda and social media, even when it is not used 
for two-way communication. This case should serve as a cause for major rethinking 
about what is required in the radicalization process and how we go about trying to 
prevent it in the first place. Traditional methods may apply to traditional cases, but 
they will be of little use in stopping violent terrorists who are effectively isolated, 
indoctrinated, and radicalized to action without ever even corresponding with the 
groups that they are being influenced by.  
After this terror attack, the New Zealand government responded quickly. 
Besides placing a ban on semi-automatic rifles, they took action regarding media 
content as well. First, they asked the social media platforms themselves to help 
curtail the spread of the shooter’s messages. Facebook reported taking down 1.5 
million copies of the video. The New Zealand police quickly urged people not to 
share the video of the attack or the manifesto, under threat of law (Lieu, 2019). In 
fact, an eighteen-year-old was arrested and charged for sharing the livestream of 
the shooting (Australian Associated Press, 2019). The New Zealand Government’s 
response demonstrated a clear desire to swiftly combat the terrorist’s social media 
goals      with force while collaborating with the private companies the propaganda 
was hosted on. The success of their attempts to stop the dissemination of the content 
should be closely      studied from multiple perspectives as the methods they used 
to suppress the information will likely prove controversial in other countries like 
the United States. Whether or not these heavy-handed approaches will effectively 
prevent another similar attack cannot      be known for some time. N     ations around 
the world would be wise to      study      the response to this attack      closely as test 
of whether or not their own anti-terrorism methods need to be altered or enhanced      




From the Joint Terrorism Task Force, counter-terrorism military units, and the 
Department of Homeland Security, to city police forces and local school district 
memorandums, terrorism h     as forcefully seized the attention of      every level of 
government and poses hard questions that must be addressed by every governing 
body involved in public security. While many lessons have been learned and turned 
into effective policy, the recent trend in social media influence on terrorism has 
opened up a new set of quandaries. This medium of terror can’t be fought with 
bullets and is resilient to deterrence by laws. Nevertheless, government agencies 
must be           determined to act on this trend and prevent further tragedy through 
legal means that value both the lives of citizens and their individual rights.  
 
 As is often the case in analysis, determining what not to do is just as 
important as figuring out what to do. The government certainly has its place in 
addressing this issue, but the boundaries of what are useful must first be set. 
Without the ability to directly remove terror propaganda online or arrest inciters 
abroad, many initial plans by the federal government involved counter-messaging. 
These kinds of initiatives have roots in the early 2000s when the Bush 
administration attempted to improve the United States’ image in the Middle East 
through government sponsored messaging via TV broadcasting. Studies showed, 
however, that this government-sponsored messaging actually worsened attitudes 
towards the U.S. (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2018). With the rising prominence of 
ISIS, the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications (CSCC) (today it functions under the State Department’s Global 
Engagement Center) began counter-messaging campaigns online that directly 
interacted      with extremist sympathizers. The intent this time around, having 
learned from previous mistakes, was not to make the U.S. and its allies look good, 
but rather to be critical of the terror organizations themselves. This endeavor has 
also been regarded as largely unsuccessful and has even created unintended 
consequences such as legitimizing and drawing attention to otherwise unimportant, 
minor social media accounts by extremists (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2018). Other 
federal programs housed in places like the Department of Defense have met similar 
embarrassing failures.  
  While counter-messaging from state-sponsored media is generally ill-
advised, the government does have another option that can be drastically more 
successful, though it is met with its own challenges. Rather than combatting 
existing online rhetoric, the government can attempt to remove and prevent the 
spread of violent extremist propaganda online. Instead of trying to counter 
messages, simply denying terror organizations the ability to utilize these public-
facing platforms may be more effective. Given all the benefits of online recruitment 
outlined in the literature review, it should be considered a worthwhile endeavor. 
The primary hindrances to this approach, however, are typically the laws of the 
country wanting to counter online extremism. Many nations protect inflammatory 
speech from government censorship, although this varies country-to-country. 
European nations, for example, often have more flexibility to outlaw certain kinds 
of speech, such as Germany did in 2017 when it mandated social media platforms 
remove illegal terror speech within 24 hours of it being posted (Bipartisan Policy 
Center, 2018). Nations like the United States, on the other hand, face more obstacles 
as concerns about protecting the constitutional right to free speech are brought into 
question. Typically, graphic images and speech that would be considered “hate 
speech” are protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
In order for speech to meet standards that allow for it to be censored, it must insight 
direct violence or pose a “clear and present danger” to other people (Haughom, 
 
2016). While some terror propaganda can meet this threshold, the Federal 
Government is typically reserved in how it handles such cases. While it is wise for 
the government to continue to show deference to the free speech rights of its own 
citizens, it nevertheless cannot afford to dismiss the real danger posed by terror 
organizations’ influence online. For instance, ISIS frequently claimed 
responsibility for lone-wolf terror attacks perpetrated by people influenced through 
its online calls for violence. E     lectronic literature published by Al Qaeda affiliates 
influenced the Boston Marathon Bombers, the Pulse Nightclub shooter was      
radicalized online, and dozens of ISIS videos were found on the cellphone of the 
perpetrator           of the 2017 New York City truck ramming attack (Isacson, 2018). 
In the case of the New Zealand terror attack in Christchurch, the government did 
respond by outlawing the sharing of any terror content related to the incident 
through social media (Lieu, 2019). It has yet to be seen if their government will 
attempt any counter-messaging campaigns or if they will focus strictly on targeting 
the removal of terror propaganda online. Other nations should closely watch this 
case as it      continues to unfold and see whether or not these methods were 
successful in preventing the distribution of these materials, reducing future 
incidents of terror or hate crimes, and if the general public is accepting of these 
imposed restrictions.  
 
SOCIAL MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS’ RESPONSE 
 
With the government’s hands largely tied with respect to preventing and removing 
terror propaganda     , an answer must come from the private sector. In previous 
years, social media companies often held themselves as unadulterated protectors of 
free speech. Twitter even once promised that it would never censor terrorists on its 
platform. But today that landscape has changed dramatically as large social media 
platforms face increasing public pressure to curtail their role in acts of violence. 
Presently     , these networks employ three primary methods to disrupt the 
distribution of terror propaganda. First, many of these companies employ thousands 
of human reviewers who can sift through flagged content and deem it unacceptable 
for violating terms and conditions that specify that calls to extremism are not 
tolerated. This flagged content often then falls into the second method which is 
called automated blacklisting (Leetaru, 2018). When content has been flagged as 
unacceptable, an electronic ‘tag’ marks it so that if the same content appears again 
on the platform (e.g., a viral terror video making the rounds on Facebook) it will be 
automatically blocked before it can be shared again. While this method proved to 
be more scalable than relying on expensive human workers, it is not as precise as it 
cannot detect new content nor intelligently determine whether or not content 
violates established rules. This brought about the need for the third category of 
mechanisms: artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms. Companies 
 
like Google have developed state-of-the-art software programs that can identify 
extremist messaging in foreign languages, pick up inflammatory terrorist speech 
amidst loud propaganda videos, and even use reverse image searching to identify 
terror organization symbols and references embedded in images (Leetaru, 2018). 
According to these companies’ own data, “every single minute there are on average 
510,000 comments and 136,000 photos shared on Facebook, 350,000 tweets posted 
on Twitter, and 300 hours of video uploaded to YouTube” (Macdonald, 2018). With 
this tremendous amount of content to sift through, many of these organizations have 
teamed up to share database information to help each other more quickly recognize 
terror-related content when terror groups attempt to shift social media platforms 
after getting banned on one of them (Macdonald, 2018).  
 The largest challenge to this now successful process is that terror groups are 
increasingly able to utilize the reach of these public media platforms while hosting 
their content on smaller sites through a method called outlinking. Put s     imply, 
they can host their content on smaller platforms that lack the resources to effectively 
fight their messages and spread links to it through the major media outlets and these 
posts go unmolested as the links themselves possess no content that will be flagged 
by a blacklist or even artificial intelligence. Finally, once they have successfully 
recruited new members, they can utilize encrypted messaging sites      like Telegram 
so that none of their conversations can be picked up by social media sites and 
handed over to authorities (Macdonald, 2018).  
 While private social media companies do not have the same legal obligation 
to protect free speech that the government does, they should nevertheless make 
careful considerations for what kind of speech they will target for removal. A net 
cast too narrowly will miss harmful content that can lead to violent radicalization, 
while a net cast too wide may lead to the removal of speech that is legal, even if 
undesirable. Recent conversations in the United States about this kind of 
censorship, which is often accused of being politically motivated even when 
companies claim it is done for harm-reduction reasons, have begun to push for the 
removal of Section 230 protections for social media companies from the federal 
Communications Decency Act. Some proponents of this action argue that social 
media companies are acting as publishers when they choose to censor speech based 
on political content rather than legality, and therefore should lose protections 
intended for websites that simply host third-party generated content. Others argue 
that social media companies are actually not doing enough to remove harmful 
content or prevent illegal actions on their platforms (Allyn, 2021). If social media 
companies veer too far one way or the other, they may either find themselves having 
to choose to not censor any content, or they may have to become something akin to 
regular publishers in order to avoid litigation due to content posted on their sites by 
third parties. The best option, it seems, would be to improve the precision of content 
moderation policies and capabilities to ensure that illegal content, including calls 
 
to radicalization and extremist violence, is removed, while other protected speech, 
including political speech, is protected vigorously. By tiptoeing across this thin 
tightrope, social media companies may be able to strike a balance that preserves 
their Section 230 protections, allows for free speech on their platforms, and protects 




Defining terrorism is difficult. Understanding exactly what constitutes this 
designation will always be a subject of debate as methods of attacks and the agendas 
behind them continue to change shape. But one piece of the puzzle that has 
remained constant is the audience. All terror attacks have an intended audience 
beyond the immediate victims that is meant to react in some way to the attack. That 
is what fundamentally sets terrorism apart from other means of violence like crime 
or war. Despite this key element of what makes terrorism, terrorism, there is a 
profoundly shocking lack of academic or even journalistic writing on what or how 
society itself should respond to these new kinds of attacks or try to prevent them. It 
is a fatal mistake to assume that only the government or large private entities are 
capable of having an impact on how and why terror occurs. Ultimately, terrorism’s 
lasting effects take a toll on society as a whole and the effects of social media have 
only served to amplify its reach and lasting impact (Innes, 2015).  
Whatever methods are taken to prevent terror messaging or recruitment, it 
must be remembered that the root of all terrorist activity is the impact it seeks to 
have on its audience. But if that audience doesn’t give terror the time of day, then 
the terror might just go away. Violent acts may still occur, but it is likely that they 
will be far less frequent as the appeal that fame and importance have slowly drift 
away. If this country really wants to protect itself, it must start by changing the way 
this generation plays into the hands of the terrorists and teaching the next generation 
to do the same. The Christchurch attack cannot be ignored. It is a crystal-clear 
example of how modern society and its social media inundation have enabled and 
emboldened individual terrorists to act with shocking levels of sophistication to 
achieve their political aims. If its causes go ignored, our own nation and others like 
it may be doomed to repeat it. Ironically, perhaps, paying additional focus to this 
attack may finally help us understand what has gone so horribly wrong with the 
way our modern society fixates on these terror attacks and inadvertently elevates 
the political aims of the perpetrators by splashing their names, faces, and 
motivations across cable news and social media platforms alike. Preventing the next 
terrorist from ever self-radicalizing online is a noble goal, but it can only be 







 Social media was all fun and games (or perhaps cats and memes) until 
people started getting hurt. Society is beginning to reckon with the absolute power, 
both for good and for evil, that modern technology has brought about with instant 
unfiltered global communications. Like all other facets of society, terror 
organizations have latched onto the previously untapped abilities of these tools and 
utilized them for their own nefarious purposes. This study highlighted a number of 
important findings pertaining to this reality. First, social media has allowed for a 
reversal of the terror recruitment process. Now, vulnerable individuals can find 
their way to the propaganda of recruiters instead of the other way around. Second, 
social media expands the reach of these recruiters past geographic constraints. No 
longer must they worry about being caught during the process of crossing 
international borders, much less the expense of it all. Instead, they can access 
potential new members anywhere in the world, at any given time, at no cost. Third, 
social media can create a virtual community and echo chamber for radical beliefs. 
It allows for terror-minded groups and individuals to control the messaging that is 
bombarding isolated recruits such that they begin to internally embrace the group 
identity process and the confirmation bias that accompanies it. Finally, and most 
importantly, social media can suffice as a medium to fully radicalize an individual 
without the need for any direct contact by a radical group. This is a fundamental 
shift from what used to be theorized about what was required for the radicalization 
of new terrorists. While the group identity and isolation process is still important, 
it can be achieved solely through self-radicalization means online as demonstrated 
in the 2019 Christchurch terror attack. Counterterrorism efforts around the world 
must now ask if new measures are necessary to combat the process of social media 
radicalization and determine what research needs to be done accordingly. Finally, 
governments, social media companies, and society itself must all ask what 
responsibility falls on them to adapt to and ultimately prevent social media 
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